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Abstract—Secure E-voting is a challenging protocol.Several ap-
proaches based on homomorphic crypto systems, mix-nets blind
signatures are proposed in the literature.But most of them need
complicated homomorphic encryption which involves complicated
encryption decryption process and key management which is
not efficient.In this paper we propose a secure and efficient
E-voting scheme based on secret sharing homomorphism.Here
E-voting is viewed as special case of multi party computation
where several voters jointly compute the result without revealing
his vote.Secret sharing schemes are good alternative for secure
multi party computation and are computationally efficient and
secure compared with the cryptographic techniques.It is the first
proposal, which make use of the additive homomorphic property
of the Shamir’s secret sharing scheme and the encoding-decoding
of votes to obtain the individual votes obtained by each candidates
apart from the election result.We have achieved integrity and
privacy while keeping the efficiency of the system.
Keywords:E-voting, homomorphism,multi-party computa-
tion,secret sharing,individual votes
I. INTRODUCTION
Voting is a distributed decision making process involving
several people.Each participant called the voter casts a vote and
the computations are performed on the vote casts by different
voters to select the preferred item.Voting can be modeled as a
secure multi party computation system, since multiple parties
submit input and obtain the result without knowing any details
of other inputs.
The process involved in traditional election is quite tedious,
time and resource consuming. To overcome these difficulties
E-voting system is introduced.The evolving new technologies
made e-voting practical.But the research in this direction has
to go a long way.The reliability and security are the major
challenge.E-voting provides a lot of benefits compared with
traditional voting.It avoids the requirement of geographical
proximity of users.The cost can be greatly reduced because
the resources can be reused. The use of E-voting must satisfy
the security requirements such as authentication, voter privacy,
confidentiality, integrity, etc.The security flaws make E-voting
vulnerable than traditional system.Gritzalis et al [21],[22]
mentioned the requirements of a secure E-voting system.
Confidentiality,Authenticity,Integrity and Verifiability
are the major security requirements in E-voting
scenario.Confidentiality ensures that nobody knows whom the
voter is voted.Authentication is an important process where
each voter must be identified as a person he claims to be and
he should not be allowed to vote again.Integrity of the votes
are also important.The system should ensure that the votes
are valid and any modification must be detected.Verifiability
means any one can verify at later time that, the voting is
properly performed or his vote was properly registered and
has been taken into account in the final tally [20].
The are several proposal for efficient secret ballot elections
based on mix-nets [36] [41] [27], homomorphic encryption
[17] [40] [10] [11] [16] and blind signatures [20] [33]. There
are different methods addressing the security and reliability
of the E-voting scheme.Most of the approaches are based
on cryptography.The major objective is to protect the voters
identity from the vote.Secure E-voting using Blind Signature
is proposed in [25].RSA [37] and Blind signatures are the ma-
jor cryptographic algorithms involved[13],[14].Homomorphic
encryption techniques are used in several implementations
[35].Several proposal for verifiable secret sharing schemes
are also given in [10], [11]. Several modifications and use
of homomorphic encryption and verifiable secret shuffle are
mentioned in [30] [24] [32]. Malkhi et al [31] in 2003
gave constructions without cryptographic technique which uses
secret sharing homomorphism.Iftene [26] in 2007 proposed a
general secret sharing for E-voting using Chinese remainder
theorem . Pailliar’s crypto system and its application to voting
is proposed by Damagaard et al [19] in 2010.Discrete loga-
rithm problem and secret sharing are used by Chen et al [18]
in 2014.Scheme with enhanced confidentiality and privacy is
suggested by Pan et al [34] in 2014.
Secret sharing and many variations of its form an important
primitive in several security protocols and applications.In the
proposed method we make of Shamir’s [1] secret sharing tech-
niques and its additive homomorphism property for efficient
E-voting and vote tallying.Hence it avoids the complicated
encryption decryption process and key management.The secret
sharing schemes are originally proposed by Shamir [1] and
Blackley [2] in 1979. The motivation was to safeguard cryp-
tographic keys. The secret keys are stored at several locations
as shares and when authorized number of users collaborate
together, they can retrieve the secret.This provides both secu-
rity,reliability and trust.The shares are information theoretically
secure and provides no information about the key.The schemes
are (t, n) threshold schemes where any t number of users can
collaborate to recover the secret out of n users.Less than t users
cannot obtain any information about the secret.Secret sharing
scheme is perfect if less than t shares gives no information
about the secret.The secret sharing scheme is ideal if the share
size is same as the secret size.Shamir’s scheme is perfect and
also ideal.It is easy to implement and is based on polynomial
interpolation.Blackley’s scheme is not perfect.It is based on
hyperplane geometry and it is difficult to implement.There
are other schemes based on boolean operations [29] [42] and
number theory [3] [4].
Properties of polynomials give Shamir’s scheme a (+,+)
homomorphic property.The secret domain and the share do-
main is same ( integers modulo p).There are other schemes
[8],[28] which also have (+,+) homomorphism, we consider
Shamir’s scheme for the ease of implementation and also it
is perfect and information theoretically secure. The homomor-
phism also provides verifiable secret sharing.It is very impor-
tant in secure multi party computation.The first proposal of
verifiable secret sharing was done by Chor et al [15].In secret
sharing not only the participant but also the dealer may be
malicious.So the participant must be able to verify whether the
shares are consistent.A set of n shares is t consistent if every
subset of t of the n shares defines the same secret.Publicly
verifiable secret sharing scheme’s are introduced by Stadler
in 1996 [38].Schoenmakers [39] in 1999 proposed a publicly
verifiable secret sharing scheme(PVSS) with applications to
E-voting.The scheme is better than [16],[17]. The issue of
homomorphic secret sharing for PVSS is also discussed.An
efficient PVSS is suitable for the secure implementation of
E-voting.
II. PRELIMINARIES
The proposed scheme uses Shamir’s threshold (t, n) secret
sharing scheme [1], which is having all the required property
for efficient implementation of E-voting.The cryptographic
techniques used for E-voting makes use of several mathe-
matical assumptions.The use of secret sharing homomorphism
avoids these problems and provides perfect secrecy.This sec-
tion explores Shamir’s secret sharing technique and the use of
homomorphism property for e-voting.
A. Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme
Let n, t ∈ N, t ≤ n, a (t, n) secret sharing protocol allows
the shares of the secret to be distributed to n participants and
any t of them can collaborate to retrieve the secret.Shamir [1]
uses a polynomial based construction for the implementation
of (t, n) threshold scheme.It is based on the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Let l, t ∈ N.Also let xi, yi ∈ Z/pZ, 1 ≤ i ≤ l,
where p is prime and xi are pairwise distinct.Then there exist
pt−l polynomial q ∈ Z/pZ[X ] of degree ≤ t−1 with q(xi) =
yi, 1 ≤ i ≤ l
Proof: The polynomial can be obtained from the points
(xi, yi) using Lagrange interpolation formula.
q(X) =
t∑
i=1
yi
t∏
j=1,j 6=i
xj −X
xj − xi
It satisfies q(xi) = yi, 1 ≤ i ≤ l.
We can determine number of such polynomials of degree
≤ t− 1.
q(X) =
t−1∑
i=0
aiX
i , ai ∈ Z/pZ, 0 ≤ i ≤ t− 1
We can obtain a system of linear equations from q(xi) =
yi, 1 ≤ i ≤ l
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Lets consider the coefficient matrix
C =
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The coefficient matrix is a Vandermonde matrix [43]. Since
the x′is are distinct the determinant
∏
i≤i≤j≤l
(xi − xj) is non
zero and the coefficient matrix has rank l.Thus the kernal of the
coefficient matrix has rank t− l.So the number of polynomials
is pt−l since each coefficient can take any of the p values.
The secret sharing protocol consist of following phases.
1) Initialization: In this phase, the dealer who wants to
distribute the secret K must choose a prime number p larger
than the secret and also p must be greater than n, where n is
the number of participants.The dealer then choose different
xi ∈ Z/pZ, 1 ≤ i ≤ n corresponds to each participants.The
x′is are then published.
2) Secret Sharing: The secret K ∈ Z/pZ is distributed as
shares to the participants securely in this phase.
The dealer chooses ai ∈ Z/pZ, 1 ≤ i ≤ t−1 and construct
a polynomial q(X) of degree t−1 such that the constant term
q(0) represents the secret.
q(X) = K +
t−1∑
i=1
aiX
i
The shares corresponds to each participants are constructed
by evaluating the polynomial at corresponding xi values.
yi = q(xi), 1 ≤ i ≤ n
.
The shares, yi are then distributed to i’th participants
securely 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
3) Secret Reconstruction: When t or more participants col-
laborate together,they can retrieve the secret K by combining
the shares.Let yi = q(xi), 1 ≤ i ≤ t ,be the t shares.Then by
using Lagrange Interpolation, the polynomial of degree t− 1
can be reconstructed from these t points using the formula
q(X) =
t∑
i=1
yi
t∏
j=1,j 6=i
xj −X
xj − xi
As per theorem 1 , there is exactly one such polynomial of
degree ≤ t− 1. The participants can obtain the secret K as
K = q(0) =
t∑
i=1
yi
t∏
j=1,j 6=i
xj
xj − xi
It is noted that less than t share holders get no information
about the secret.All constant term are equally likely and is an
element in the field.The scheme is information theoretically
secure.
B. Secret Sharing Homomorphism
Secret sharing homomorphism introduced by Benaloh in
1987 [9].It is noted that Shamir’s scheme is additive homo-
morphic.He stated that any t of the n agents can determine
the super secret and no conspiracy of fewer than t agents can
gain any information at all about any of the sub secrets. That is
the sum of the shares of different sub secret when added up and
then interpolate according to the threshold mentioned to obtain
the master secret which is the sum of the sub secrets.He also
mentioned the importance of secret sharing homomorphism to
E-voting.
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme has the (+,+) homomor-
phism property. For example, assume there are two secrets:
K1, K2 and are shared using polynomials g(X) and f(X).If
we add the shares h(i) = g(i) + f(i), 1 ≤ i ≤ n then each
of these h(i) can be treated as the shares corresponds to the
secret K1 + K2.The polynomial h(X) = g(X) + f(X) and
h(0) = K1 + K2. But each voter choose 1 or 0 ( vote or
no vote).The shares are send to n tellers.Any t of them can
collaborate to retrieve the result back.
In case of PVSS, two operations are defined.One on the
shares ⊕, and the other operation ⊗ on the encrypted shares
such that for all participants
Ei(si)⊗ Ei(s
′
i) = E(si ⊕ s
′
i)
If the underlying secret sharing scheme is homomorphic then
by decrypting the combined encrypted shares, the recovered
secret will be equal to si ⊕ s′i.
III. PROPOSED SCHEME
The proposed system is a modification of the existing
electronic voting scheme’s used in India.Currently electronic
voting machines are used in polling booth.These machines are
costly and also not reliable.We propose an alternative solution
for this using Internet and secret sharing homomorphism.This
add trust and reliability to the existing voting scheme by
incorporating secret sharing based techniques.The secrecy of
vote is an important issue.This needs to be addressed with
ultimate care. In the current Electronic Voting System, when
a vote is casted,the corresponding candidates data base entry
is updated and it can be easily tracked.But in the proposed
scheme, it is difficult to track the vote because the shares of
the votes is added to all the servers. We also add trust to the
existing scheme by maintaining more than one server to keep
the voting details.We are not considering on-line verification of
the authenticity of the voter as in general e-voting scheme.Here
we assume that the polling officers in each polling booth has to
do it manually using the electoral role.The major components
of the proposed e-voting schemes are
1) Voting Terminal
2) Share Generation
3) Collection Centers
4) Result Computation
We have considered the user authentication process which
is done manually.The voting takes place in a Polling station.A
voter is allowed to vote after his identity is verified. A polling
station may contain many voting terminals.The user interface
shows a voting panel which contains the list of all contesting
candidates and their party symbols. Voting panel is setup and
managed by the Chief Election Officers.
The share generation module is responsible for receiving the
vote casted by each voter and make shares of it according to
the threshold secret sharing scheme. The shares are generated
according to the vote casted for each candidates.Each candidate
vote is represented as an encoded binary code.So when a
vote is casted, the shares of the decimal value corresponds
to the encoded binary vote of each candidate is generated
using the Shamir’s secret sharing scheme.The number of bits
in the encoded binary code corresponds to each candidate vote
depends on the number of contesting candidates and also total
number of voters.
Let us assume that there are m candidates C1, C2, . . . , Cm
and n voters V1, V2, . . . , Vn.Then the binary encoding of the
vote corresponds to each candidate will consist of (⌊log2n⌋+
1)×m number of bits.Here we consider the fact that all voters
may vote to the same candidate.So the number of bits required
for the representation of votes for each candidate is equal to
the number of bits required to represent the total number of
voters which is ⌊log2n⌋+ 1.
The encoding of the vote corresponds to each contesting
candidate is explained below with an example.Let us consider
that there are three candidates and seven voters.So the total
number of bits of each encoded vote will be nine.The bit
pattern corresponds to the vote of each candidate is ob-
tained by setting the corresponding bit Ci to 1 in the code
00C300C200C1 and other bits Ci to 0.For example the code
corresponds to the vote of candidate C3 is 001000000(64).So
depending on the vote casted, it is encoded into a decimal
code of 1,8 or 64 respectively.This bit wise encoding helps in
computing the total votes obtained by each candidate using the
additive homomorphism.
The encoded vote is then shared using Shamir’s threshold
secret sharing scheme.The shares are then send to different
Collection Centres(CC).The Collection Centres are responsible
for receiving and summing up the shares corresponds to
each vote casted.We can set up the threshold and also set
number of collection centres required.If there are p collection
centres CC1, CC2, . . . , CCp and a threshold t < p is set
so that we can get back the result from any t collection
centres.This provides trust and reliability.Based on the number
of collection centres and threshold set up, Shamir’s scheme
can be used for a threshold (t, p) secret sharing.A t−1 degree
polynomial q(x) is constructed with constant term representing
the encoded vote value in decimal.The other coefficients are
chosen randomly from the field Zp, where p is larger than
the encoded vote values and the number of participants.The
shares are generated by evaluating the polynomial q(x) at
p different values x1, x2, . . . , xp.These x1, x2, . . . , xp values
represent different collection centres known only to the Chief
Election Officer and are kept secret.These shares are then send
securely to the p collection centres.Any t of them can be used
for result evaluation and verification.The shares look totally
random and the collection centres have no idea regarding
which secret (vote) share it is, from the share value.The share
size is also same as the secret size and hence it provides
information theoretical security. Once all the collection centres
receives the vote share, the voting terminal is intimated to
receive the next vote or it is the confirmation that the vote is
registered properly.
The collection centres are responsible for summing up the
shares they receive for vote tallying.Here the shares are always
valid. They are generated automatically from the terminal
program embedded.So there is no need to check the con-
sistency of the shares received by the collection centres.But
proper measures must be taken for the secure and error free
communication between the voting terminal and collection
centres.Collection centres behave as group of authorized par-
ties.In a real time voting scenario, a single machine can act
as a collection centre by maintaining database which contains
collection of shares.How ever in this case the collection centre
must be trusted.We can maintain a hierarchy of collection
centres for collecting vote shares according to the geographical
location which compute the local sum of shares. The local sum
is then send to the top level collection centres which further
add the sums of shares received from local collection centres.A
separate communication module can be incorporated for the
efficient and secure communication of shares.The collection
centres can also keep the shares received from each polling
booth or booths belongs to the same area as a separate entity
for the computation of region wise voting details.The strategy
for share maintenance, number of collection centres etc can
be determined based on the requirement.The implementation
issues also depend on the hierarchal structure used.
The Result Computation module is responsible for com-
puting and declaring the final result.From the sum of shares
stored on collection centres, the result can be obtained using
Lagrange Interpolation.If there are p collection centres and a
(t, p) threshold secret secret sharing scheme is used , then any
t of the share sum from the collection centres can be used
for computing the final result.These t shares can be used to
get back a t − 1 degree polynomial Q(x) and the encoded
result will be Q(0).The result is then decoded by converting
Q(0) into binary and then separating the bits corresponds to
each candidates.The decimal equivalent of the separated bits
represent the total vote obtained by each candidate.Based on
this the result can be announced.
It is noted that the result computation cannot be performed
by collection centres.They will just keep the share sum and
a hash is computed which is then signed by the private keys
of the collection centre.During the result computation,it can be
verified for the integrity and authenticity.This result declaration
module, is managed by higher officials and only they know
the different x values used for each collection centre during
the share generation.Any t pairs of this x values and the
corresponding share sum, which is the y values, the polynomial
interpolation can be done.The result computation can be done
with different combination of the share sum from t different
collection centres which adds reliability.The trust is maintained
by the Shamir’s scheme because less than t collection centres
cannot get any information about the final result.At least t
collection centres have to collate to get back the result.
IV. PROPOSED ALGORITHMS
The following algorithm only includes the core functionality
required.Additional functionalities can be added depending
on the requirement.Suitable hash algorithm and signature
algorithm must be chosen for maintaining the integrity and
authenticity.When the voting is finished the hash of final share
sum of each collection centre SCCj can be computed using
SHA(Secure Hash Algorithm) [46] and is digitally signed by
the previously issued private keys of the collection centre.The
election official can verify this for integrity and authenticity.
Algorithm 1: E-Voting
Input: Vote casted by the voters
Output: Sum of the shares of the votes
Let m denote the number of candidates and n denote number of voters.
Set V equals (⌊log2n⌋+ 1)×m bits for encoding the votes.
Choose an appropriate field Zp.
for each vote i = 1 : n do
enc vote = bin decimal(set bit (V ))
/* V is set according to the vote casted */
/* enc_vote is the encoded vote in decimal */
Pick t− 1 random numbers a1, a2, a3, . . . , at−1 from Zp
Construct the polynomial
q(x)=enc vote +a1x + a2x2 + · · · + at−1xt−1
for j = 1 : p do
Generate share Vij = q(j)
/* where Vij is the jth share of ith vote */
Send the share Vij to Cthj collection centre
through a secure communication channel
end
for each Collection Centre j = 1 : p do
Sum of shares SCCj = SCCj + Vij
end
end
V. E-VOTING EXAMPLE
Let us assume that three people Alice,Bob and Charles are
contesting in an election and there are seven voters.So the
Algorithm 2: Result Computation
Input: Share sum of the votes from collection centre
Output: Votes obtained by each candidate
for each randomly chosen t Collection Centre j = 1 : t do
retrieve SCCj
end
Interpolate using SCCj and corresponding xi values to obtain the polynomial
Q(x)
Obtain the secret value Q(0).
Decode Q(0) and obtain the binary representation.
Each (⌊log2n⌋+ 1) bits will represent each candidates vote.
Publish the final results.
maximum vote each contestant can get is seven.Three bits are
hence required for the representation of votes gained by each
candidate and a total of nine bits for the representation of
encoded votes corresponds to each candidate.
m = 3, n = 7, V = 9bits
A sample voting scenario is given below where six voters
made the vote out of seven.
TABLE I
EXAMPLE E-VOTING
Vote Alice Bob Charles Encoding VoteBinary Decimal
1  001000000 64
2  000001000 8
3  000001000 8
4  001000000 64
5  000000001 1
6  001000000 64
The votes are encoded as shown in Table I corresponds
to each contesting candidate.Lets choose a field Z257.We have
considered a (2, 3) secret sharing scheme where any two shares
can be used to reconstruct the secret .Every time a vote is
casted, a random polynomial q(x) of degree 1 are constructed
with constant term as the encoded vote and the other coefficient
are chosen randomly from Z257.Generate the three shares
CC1, CC2 and CC3 with xi’s as 1,2 and 3.It is noted that
the shares are random irrespective of the encoded vote.So the
collection centre cannot derive any information about the secret
from the shares they receive.The collection centre also compute
the share sum SCCj from the shares they receive.Table II
shows the random polynomials constructed,the corresponding
shares generated and also the share sum in the sample run of
the algorithm corresponds to (2, 3) secret sharing scheme.
The election result can be computed from the sum of shares
SCCj maintained by each collection centre using Lagrange
interpolation.The polynomial Q(x) can be obtained using any
two shares in the example using the Lagrange Interpolation
formula as follows.
Q(x) = SCC1.
(x− x2)
(x1 − x2)
+ SCC2.
(x− x1)
(x2 − x1)
The final result depends on Q(0) which is easily obtained
by
Q(0) = SCC1.
(x2)
(x2 − x1)
+ SCC2.
(x1)
(x1 − x2)
TABLE II
VOTE SHARING
Vote enc vote q(x) Shares
CC1 CC2 CC3
1 64 233.x+64 40 16 249
2 8 157.x+8 165 65 222
3 8 78.x+8 86 164 242
4 64 255.x+64 62 60 58
5 1 217.x+1 218 178 138
6 64 124.x+64 188 55 179
share sum SCCj 245 24 60
Computation of results using different combination of
shares SCC1 : SCC2, SCC1 : SCC3 and SCC2 : SCC3 are
shown in equation 1,2 and 3.The operations are carried out in
Z257.It is noted that the reconstructed values are consistent.
Q(0) = 245. 22−1 + 24.
1
1−2 = 209 (1)
Q(0) = 245. 33−1 + 60.
1
1−3 = 209 (2)
Q(0) = 24. 33−2 + 60.
2
2−3 = 209 (3)
The final result can be obtained by decoding the recon-
structed result 209 into binary.It is noted that 3 bits will
represent vote secured by each candidate.
decoded vote : 011, 010, 001
The result can be published based on the obtained values
which is shown below.
TABLE III
E-VOTING RESULT
Candidate Votes Secured
Alice 3
Bob 2
Charles 1
VI. ANALYSIS
Security in online election is a challenging
task.Authenticating the voter is a major challenge along
with the privacy of the vote.We have considered manual
authentication and proposed a modification to the existing
voting scheme which uses electronic voting machine.The
voting machines are not reliable and also in certain situations
where the number of candidates are more, more than one
voting machine needs to be connected.The proposed scheme
is cost effective and also reliable.
It is noted that the proposed algorithm mentioned is simple
and effective and provides privacy to the vote casted.The shares
are generated by constructing a random polynomial and the
share size is same as the encoded vote.The collection centers
have no idea about how the votes are encoded, how many
bits are used for encoding, which bits represents a particular
candidate votes etc.The collection centres will receive a ran-
dom value from the field Zp from which no information about
the secret vote can be obtained.The coalition of t untrusted
collection centers can obtain the result.But they doesn’t have
any knowledge about the number of collection centres,the
threshold used and also what is the x values assigned to each
collection centre.In the example we have considered 1,2 and
3 for simplicity, however different x values can be used and
is kept secret.
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme is information theoretically
secure.It is perfect in the sense that no information can be ob-
tained from less than the threshold number of participants.This
adds trust to the existing E-voting scheme,because the com-
putation of the result need participation of t centers.The
computation of the shares and the reconstruction of the final
result using the share sum can be done using polynomial
evaluation and interpolation.Efficient O(n.log2n) algorithms
for polynomial evaluation and interpolation are mentioned in
[6],[5].Simple quadratic algorithms are sufficient because the
number of shares generated is not too large.
The encoding and decoding of the votes can also be done
easily.The codes for each candidates and also the number of
bits required to represent the votes depends on the number of
voters and number of contesting candidate.These setups are
done by the election officials prior to the election process.The
decoding of votes is a simple binary conversion which can also
be done easily. The integrity of the share sum maintained by
each centre is achieved by implementing a digital signature
scheme.This can also be efficiently implemented using any
digital signature scheme [44].
The algorithm is computationally efficient and the com-
plexity involved depends on the share generation during the
voting and the communication with the Collection Centres
.The number of shares are usually small and hence the share
generation using polynomial evaluation is simple.The secure
communication between the voting terminal and the collection
centre is a more challenging.Separate communication module
can be incorporated to do it efficiently.The collection centre
must also be capable of handling requests from large number
of voting terminals.Region wise collection centres can be
incorporated to balance the load and update the top level
collection centre data in a periodic manner.The result analysis
needs the polynomial interpolation but is done only once and it
doesnt add much complexity to the performance of the system.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The E-voting scheme using Shamir’s secret sharing home-
omorphism is a first proposal which helps to obtain not only
the election result but also the votes gained by each candidate
with encoding and decoding of votes in a typical manner.The
proposal of secret sharing homomorphism was suggested by
several authors, however true or false voting mechanism is
mentioned.The proposed algorithm generalize the use of secret
sharing homomorphism to E-voting which provides secrecy,
computational efficiency, trust and reliability.The system does
not also leave any trace of the vote made by a voter.
The strong requirement of the scheme mentioned here is
a secure channel for sending shares.The shares can be send
through different channels to different collection centres.The
intruder have to get access to t different channels for breaking
the security of the scheme.For additional security, the shares
can also be encrypted by using the public keys of the collec-
tion centre.There are several homomorphic encryptions which
support this or ordinary encryption decryption can be used.
The system works efficiently for a moderate election with
less number of voters. If the number of voters and candidates
are more, the encoded vote will have a large value and the
system has to chose a field of large size.This will large
share size and too much communication overhead.This can
be avoided by breaking the encoded vote into smaller code
and makes shares of it.However the complexity involved in
the implementation will increase.
We have done a preliminary implementation of the scheme
using java [45].Additional modules are incorporated as per
the requirement.Another feature that can be incorporated is
the implementation of digital signature scheme,which ensures
integrity and authenticity of the shares.Verifiable secret shar-
ing techniques can also be incorporated which ensures the
consistency of the shares, however it slow down the system
performance. We are looking for a more sophisticated im-
plementation guaranteeing authentication using mobile phones
and OTP(One Time Password) for all the users using adhar
details.Instead of voting terminals every one can vote using
the registered mobile which is our future plan.
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